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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Gary Leon Chaffin, II, asserts the district court erred when it allowed irrelevant testimony
from a State's witness. During Mr. Chaffin's jury trial, the State argued that Mr. Chaffin, while
under contract to paint the witness's house, had forged a false receipt to get a payment from the
witness. The State also argued Mr. Chaffin had stolen from the witness by taking his money to
purchase paint, without actually purchasing or intending to purchase it. The district court, over
Mr. Chaffin's objection, allowed the witness to testify on cross-examination that he had safety
concerns about himself and his property, and Mr. Chaffin had left syringes at the property. The
jury found Mr. Chaffin guilty of felony forgery, and not guilty of felony grand theft.
On appeal, Mr. Chaffin asserts that the district court erred when it allowed the witness to
testify about his safety concerns and Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes at the witness's property,
because the testimony was not relevant.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Chaffin with felony forgery and felony grand theft. (R., pp.6365.) During Mr. Chaffin's jury trial, Natalie and Ryan Raymond testified they contracted with
Mr. Chaffin and his company, Snake River Painting, to paint their new house west of Blackfoot.
(See Tr. 7/17/18, p.89, L.8-p.91, L.4, p.182, L.21-p.183, L.14.) Snake River Painting had two

email addresses: a "Gary" at Snake River Painting account, and a "SnakeRiverPaint" at Gmail
account. (See Tr. 7/17 /18, p.168, Ls.2-7.) Ms. Raymond testified the Raymonds' business email
was an "RCSupply" at Gmail account. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.92, L.24-p.93, L.7.)
On cross-examination, Ms. Raymond testified that after they received the bid from the
Gary email account in June 2017, they received another email stating, "My son sent the bid for
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me and I don't think he sent it to the right address." (Tr. 7/17/18, p.138, L.22 - p.139, L.12;
Defendant's Ex. A.) They responded with an email stating they had received both emails. ( See
Tr. 7/17/18, p.139, Ls.13-15; Defendant's Ex. A.) Ms. Raymond also testified that the majority
of the emails they received had Mr. Chaffin's signature. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.139, Ls.17-22.)
Mr. Raymond testified that they decided to hire Mr. Chaffin in July 2017.

(See

Tr. 7/17/18, p.183, Ls.10-14.) The contract Snake River Painting prepared provided that all paint
would be stored at the project location. (Plaintiffs Ex. 1, p.2; see Tr. 7/17/18, p.101, Ls.10-11.)
The estimated total cost for the paint was $3,570.00. (Plaintiffs Ex. 1, p.2; see Tr. 7/17/18,
p.100, Ls.17-22.) An email from the Gary account to the RCSupply account, dated August 3,
2017, stated the paint costs would be divided into two payments of $1,785.00 each. (Plaintiffs
Ex. 2.) The Raymonds testified the first payment was to be made before Mr. Chaffin started so
he could purchase some of the paint, and the second payment would be made a week later. (See
Tr., 7/17/18, p.104, L.19 - p.105, L.5, p.187, Ls.7-15.) They paid the first payment by check on
August 5, 2017. (Plaintiffs Ex. 4; see Tr. 7/17/18, p.187, Ls.9-12.)
The Raymonds testified that Mr. Chaffin told them the work was supposed to take about
two weeks.

(See Tr. 7/17/18, p.106, Ls.3-11, p.186, Ls.7-21.)

Ms. Raymond testified

Mr. Chaffin started on August 5, 2017, while Mr. Raymond testified the start date was August 8.
(See Tr. 7/17/18, p.106, Ls.18-19, p.190, Ls.21-25.) They testified that, around August 12 to

August 15, they received from the Gary email account an invoice for the second payment. (See
Plaintiffs Ex. 5; Tr. 7/17/18, p.111, Ls.11-20, p.187, Ls.12-15.) The invoice was for a total of
$1,696.83, with a reduction of $88.17 for "Price Adjustment Stan's Paint Clinic Lower Price."
(Plaintiffs Ex. 6.) The invoice email also had a receipt from Stan's Paint Clinic, showing a total
purchase price of$3,269.18. (Plaintiffs Ex. 9; see Tr. 7/17/18, p.187, Ls.12-15.) Mr. Raymond
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testified Mr. Chaffin had told them Stan's Paint Clinic was offering a higher quality paint at a
better price. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.188, Ls.17-23.) The Raymonds paid the second payment by
check on August 12, 2017. (Plaintiffs Ex. 7; see Tr. 7/17/18, p.187, Ls.16-21.)
Ms. Raymond testified there were times they did not see Mr. Chaffin working during the
day, and they did not see any paint stored on site as required by the contract. (See Tr. 7/17 /18,
p.105, L.20 - p.106, L.2.) Mr. Raymond testified he had seen about 15-25 gallons of paint, but
by August 15, 2017, he had not seen any additional paint stored on site. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.190,
L.11 - p.191, L.11.) The Raymonds testified that, on August 15, Mr. Chaffin informed them he
had the paint in the back ofhis truck. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.121, Ls.12-20, p.191, Ls.12-16.) They
testified that, on August 16, he told them he did not have the paint and it had been used at
another job. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.121, L.21 - p.122, L.12, p.191, L.17 - p.192, L.3.) Mr. Chaffin
told them he was waiting for a check to clear so he could buy more paint. (See Tr. 7/17 /18,
p.122, L.15 - p.123, L.1, Tr. 7/18/18, p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.1.)

On cross-examination,

Mr. Raymond testified that, at that point, he thought Mr. Chaffin did not intend to purchase the
paint and had already stolen from them. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.10, L.20-p.12, L.13.)
Later on August 16, 2017, Mr. Raymond and Mr. Chaffin went to buy more paint, which
Mr. Raymond purchased. (See Tr., 7/17/18, p.193, Ls.4-16.) Mr. Raymond testified that, on
August 17, they found that Mr. Chaffin's supplies and tools were gone from the house. (See
Tr. 7/17/18, p.137, Ls.11-19, p.193, Ls.16-21.) According to Ms. Raymond, by that date about
seventy-five percent of the house had been primed, and about ten percent of the house had been
painted. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.107, Ls.9-12.) The Raymonds testified that, on August 18, they
brought in someone else to fmish painting, and Mr. Chaffin painted for a couple hours on that
date and left. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.123, Ls.6-16, p.203, Ls.11-16.)
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Ms. Raymond testified that she called Stan's Paint Clinic on August 23 or 24, 2017, and
the manager there told her he could not find any transactions for the amount on the receipt. (See
Tr. 7/17/18, p.176, L.5 - p.177, L.1.) She testified that she emailed the manager the receipt, and
the manager told her it was not a receipt from the store and he could not find a transaction for
that amount on that date. (See Tr. 7/17/18, p.176, Ls.9-19.) The owner of Stan's Paint Clinic
testified that he had no records of doing business with Mr. Chaffin or Snake River Painting. (See
Tr. 7/18/18, p.78, L.18 - p.79, L.18.) The owner also testified that the receipt he received from
Ms. Raymond did not match his store's receipts. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.80, L.20-p.87, L.16.)
Meanwhile, Mr. Raymond had a conversation with Deputy Van Orden on August 18,
2017. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.18, Ls.2-4.) On cross-examination, Mr. Raymond testified that he only
remembered parts of that conversation. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.20, L.14 - p.26, L.4.) To refresh
Mr. Raymond's memory, defense counsel played the video recording of the conversation for the
witness outside the presence of the jury. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.26, L.5 - p.47, L.20.) At one point
in the conversation, Mr. Raymond told Deputy Van Orden that Mr. Chaffin appeared to be a
drug addict and had left some needles in buckets. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.36, Ls.5-9.)
Mr. Raymond then testified he had not told the deputy that he had hired another painter.
(See Tr. 7/18/18, p.52, L.15 - p.53, L.4.) Mr. Raymond also testified that, after Deputy Van

Orden indicated he could try to contact Mr. Chaffin, he replied, "Encourage him to settle up.
Maybe scare him a little for me." (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.53, L.25 -p.54, L.6.)
On redirect examination, the State asked Mr. Raymond, "when you talked to Deputy Van
Orden, did you have any concerns for safety of yourself or your property?" (Tr. 7/18/18, p.56,
Ls.5-6.)

Mr. Chaffin objected "as to relevance and as to beyond the scope of the cross-

examination," but the district court responded, "Overruled." (Tr. 7/18/18, p.56, Ls.9-11.)
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Mr. Raymond then answered:

"Absolutely.

That was one of my major-also major

reasons to have him come out." (Tr. 7/18/18, p.56, Ls.12-13.) When asked what his concern
was, Mr. Raymond testified: "We felt like anytime, if someone wasn't there, there could be
damage done to the property. We had seen syringes in buckets. We felt the safety [sic] for our
kids because they were on the site at all time with us, playing around. We didn't want to have
them harmed by needles and stuff that were found on the property, so we wanted to get them
disposed of properly." (Tr. 7/18/18, p.56, Ls.15-21.) He testified that, when he talked to the
deputy about the safety concerns, he inquired about putting a restraining order on Mr. Chaffin,
and then the deputy "examined the syringes, the syringe that was in the bucket, and made sure
there wasn't a needle in it." (Tr. 7/18/18, p.58, Ls.6-14.)
On recross-examination, Mr. Raymond testified he was not aware that Mr. Chaffin had
Type 2 diabetes, nor was he aware that people with diabetes needed to inject themselves with
insulin. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.71, Ls.1-5.) When asked if Mr. Chaffin's diabetes would explain the
syringes at the jobsite, Mr. Raymond testified it did not. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.71, Ls.6-12.)
Deputy Van Orden testified he spoke briefly with Mr. Chaffin on August 18, 2017, told
him he had been trespassed from the Raymonds' property, and left it at that after Mr. Chaffin
told him they would work things out. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.13.) The deputy
testified that he received more information from Mr. Raymond on August 28. (See Tr. 7/18/18,
p.129, L.14-22.) He testified that Mr. Raymond told him about the receipt they thought had been
possibly forged after the paint supplier stated it was not their receipt, which gave the deputy
enough to begin an investigation into a possible forgery. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.130, Ls.7-19.)
Detective Marvin testified that he had been assigned to investigate the case,
Mr. Raymond sent him the receipt from Stan's Paint Clinic, and the detective called Stan's Paint
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Clinic and went to the store to investigate the receipt. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.140, L.8 - p.142, L.9.)
Later, Detective Marvin met with Mr. Chaffin. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.143, L.17 - p.144, L.25.)
The detective testified that he asked Mr. Chaffin about the Stan's Paint Clinic receipt from
Mr. Raymond and showed it to him, and Mr. Chaffin commented "to the effect that, 'Raymond
told you that,' or, 'That's what Raymond said."' (Tr. 7/18/18, p.144, L.24-p.145, L.8.)
On cross-examination, Detective Marvin testified he did not look into whether the
original emails he had been forwarded were legitimate, because that was not brought up. (See
Tr. 7/18/18, p.155, Ls.12-25.) He also did not look into who had access to the RCSupply email
account, the SnakeRiverPaint account, or the Gary account. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.156, Ls.1-25.)
After Detective Marvin's recollection was refreshed with an audio recording of his interview
with Mr. Chaffin, defense counsel asked him: "And after you showed him the receipt that is now
entered into evidence as Exhibit 9 and he said, 'If that's what he says,' isn't it true that you then
asked him, 'Well, did you give him that?' And he responded, 'No."' (Tr. 7/18/18, p.165, Ls.817.) Detective Marvin replied, "That's correct." (Tr. 7/18/18, p.165, L.18.)
Mr. Chaffin's wife testified for the defense that Mr. Chaffin's stepson had access to the
SnakeRiverPaint email account, and may also had had access to the Gary account.

( See

Tr. 7/18/18, p.181, L.4-p.182, L.17.) On cross-examination, she testified that she had also used
the SnakeRiverPaint account, but not the Gary account. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.185, L.3 - p.186,
L.18.)
The jury found Mr. Chaffin guilty of forgery, and not guilty of grand theft. (R., p.191.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, suspended
the sentence, and placed Mr. Chaffin on probation for a period of three years. (R., pp.199-03.)
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Mr. Chaffin filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment of
Conviction and Order of Probation. (R., pp.215-18.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it allowed Mr. Raymond to testify about his safety concerns and
Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes at the Raymonds' property, because the testimony was
not relevant?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Allowed Mr. Raymond To Testify About His Safety Concerns
And Mr. Chaffin Leaving Syringes At The Raymonds' Property, Because The Testimony Was
Not Relevant

A.

Introduction
Mr. Chaffin asserts that the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Raymond to testify

about his safety concerns and Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes at the Raymonds' property, because
the testimony was not relevant.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo.

State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 6 (2013). The Idaho Rules of Evidence now define evidence as
relevant if "it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the
evidence," and "the fact is of consequence in determining the action." I.R.E. 401. "Whether a
fact is 'of consequence' or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 255, 364 (2010) (quoting State v.

Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008)). The Idaho Rules of Evidence also provide: "Relevant
evidence is admissible unless these rules, or other rules applicable in the courts of this state,
provide otherwise. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible." I.R.E. 402.

C.

Mr. Raymond's Testimony About His Safety Concerns And Mr. Chaffin Leaving
Syringes At The Raymonds' Property Was Not Relevant
Mr. Chaffin asserts that Mr. Raymond's testimony about his safety concerns and

Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes at the Raymonds' property was not relevant. The testimony did not
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have any tendency to make any facts of consequence in determining the forgery action more or
less probable than it would have been without the testimony. See I.R.E. 401.
The jury found Mr. Chaffin guilty of forgery, I.C. § 18-3601. (See R., pp.63, 191.) As
the jury was instructed, the elements for this forgery charge were: “On or about August 10,
2017”; “in the state of Idaho”; “the defendant Gary L. Chaffin II”; “with the intent to defraud
Ryan Raymond”; “falsely made or forged or attempted to pass as true and genuine a false
altered, forged, or counterfeited writing, to wit: a purchase receipt for goods from Stan’s Paint
Clinic in the amount of $3269.18, knowing that the said receipt was false or forged.” (R., p.181.)
The district court also instructed the jury that an intent to deceive “is an intent to deceive
another person for the purpose of gaining some material advantage over that person or to induce
that person to part with property or to alter that person’s position to the injury or risk of the
person,” and “to accomplish that purpose by some false statement, false representation of fact,
wrongful concealment or suppression of truth, or by any other artifice or act designed to
deceive.” (R., p.182.)
When the State asked Mr. Raymond if he had any safety concerns for himself or his
property when he talked to Deputy Van Orden, and the district court overruled Mr. Chaffin’s
relevance objection, neither the State nor the district court articulated why that line of
questioning was relevant. (See Tr. 7/18/18, p.56, Ls.5-11.) Indeed, Mr. Raymond’s testimony
about his safety concerns and Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes at the Raymonds’ property was not
relevant. That Mr. Raymond had concerns for the safety of himself or his property, and that
Mr. Chaffin was supposedly leaving syringes at the property, did not have any tendency to make
any facts of consequence in determining the forgery action more or less probable than it would
have been without the testimony. See I.R.E. 401.
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For example, the testimony did not make the time, place, or identity elements of the
forgery charge more or less probable. (See R., p.181.) Nor did the testimony make it more or
less likely that Mr. Chaffin had the requisite intent to defraud Mr. Raymond. (See R., p.182.)
Mr. Raymond's safety concerns, and the syringes at the property, perhaps left there because
Mr. Chaffin was using insulin to treat his diabetes (see Tr. 7/18/18, p.71, Ls.1-12), did not make
it more or less probable that Mr. Chaffin had the intent to deceive Mr. Raymond for the purpose
of gaining some material advantage over him or inducing him to part with property, nor did those
details make it more or less probable that Mr. Chaffin was accomplishing that purpose by some
artifice or act designed to deceive. Mr. Raymond's mental state, and Mr. Chaffin's actions or
diabetes, did not help prove Mr. Chaffin' s intent. See I.R.E. 401.
Additionally, the testimony did not make it more or less probable that Mr. Raymond
knowingly passed a false or forged receipt from Stan's Paint Clinic. (See R., p.181.) Similarly,
there was no such relationship between Mr. Raymond's testimony and this element, because
Mr. Raymond's mental state and Mr. Chaffin's leaving syringes on the property (not to mention
his physical medical issues) did not help establish whether or not Mr. Chaffin had a culpable
mental state. See I.R.E. 401.
In sum, Mr. Raymond's testimony about his safety concerns and Mr. Chaffin leaving
syringes at the Raymonds' property was not relevant. Thus, the district court erred when it
allowed Mr. Raymond to testify to those ends. See I.R.E. 401 & 402.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant shows

that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
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Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To

hold an error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Mr. Chaffin asserts the State will simply be unable to show the district court's error in
allowing Mr. Raymond's testimony about his safety concerns and Mr. Chaffin leaving syringes
at the Raymonds' property is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the district court's
judgment of conviction and order of probation should be vacated, and the matter should be
remanded to the district court for a new trial.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Chaffin respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court's judgment of conviction and order of probation, and remand this matter to the district
court for a new trial.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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